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4INTRODUCTION: 
 The banking structure as it is known today in the United States largely originated in 
the 1930s after the onslaught of the Great Depression.  The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Company developed deposit insurance to stabilize the industry and protect consumers.  
They laid down rules and regulations that shaped the banking and financial sector of the 
American economy into the early form of what patrons use today.  This structure formed 
how the public viewed the industry.  Large banks were concentrated in financial centers, 
mostly New York, with some scattered in the west coast and other big cities.  Most smaller 
towns had one or two state-chartered commercial banks with thrift institutions flourishing 
alongside.  Personal and even business customers banked on a small, local scale.  Sixty plus 
years later, the same industry structure is still in place, but its face has changed dramatically.   
 It’s quite easy to think that banking has stayed static through the years and that like 
any other good old American institution it dates back to before the world wars.  Banks have 
always taken deposits, cashed checks, offered credit, etc. But even a 20 year old college 
student has enough experience to have witnessed at least the most recent major change in 
banking.  Watching the bank downtown that was at one time Shawmut, one time 
BankBoston, one time Fleet, proceed to branch throughout the state is knowledge enough.  
A dramatic shift has taken place, and most of it in the past 30 years. The financial system of 
the United States in the 21st century is vastly different from the one that was commonly used 
only one generation ago and barely recognizable from what was set in place at the dawn of 
the FDIC. The banking system has not been seriously altered, but the way banking is done 
will never be the same. 
5After the Great Depression the FDIC was developed in order to have a system in 
place to regulate banking in the United States in an effort to prevent the problems of the late 
1920s and early 30s.  These laws included precise rules governing bank branching and other 
geographical issues.  This also was the birth of thrift institutions and the delegations of roles 
between different types of banks.  Strict rules were put in place for specific reasons: such as 
spurring mortgage growth and preventing excessive lending. This system remained relatively 
stable for close to 40 years thanks to a relatively stable and growing economy.  Home loans 
and new housing grew abundantly while at the same time deposit insurance protected 
customers and boosted consumer confidence in the economy. 
Due to prevailing economic conditions and other factors, however, the 1970s became 
a time of deregulation.  It was thought that the market could better allocate resources if left 
to its own due.  With this came a sweeping drawback of the rules that had been in place for 
years. In this paper the laws that will be focused on specifically are the laws that affected the 
geography of the banking industry.  The initial proposing ideas for beginning geographic 
deregulation and the opposing views will be discussed, along with the actual measures taken.  
The initial effects of the new laws and the reaction taken by the Fed in terms of new laws 
will also be looked at. 
When the laws were altered in the 1970s to allow branching across state lines, the 
banking industry took its first big step towards laying the groundwork for the industry that 
we see today.  Unfortunately, all of these new changes did not affect all members of the 
banking industry for the better.  The increase in competition, combined with the increased 
allowance for risk taking caused the demise of many banks.  This greatly affected thrift 
6institutions and directly led to what has come to be known as the savings and loan crisis.  
The allowance of branching across state lines and changes in charter regulations also had a 
major impact on all types of banks.  The physical geography of the industry was shifted out 
of the major cities and into suburbia and small towns.  This caused its own slew of bank 
failures and in turn, major bank consolidation. 
 In the years following the deregulation and in the early 1980s, the United States lost a 
record number of commercial banks and thrift institutions to failure.  Some bigger banks 
used the new laws to acquire failing banks, but regardless, the number of total banks 
dropped dramatically.  The FDIC took measures to prevent what could have been an even 
more drastic effect on the banking industry.  A bold measure was to allow out of state banks 
to purchase failing banks.  Banks that could afford it jumped at this opportunity and started 
the ball rolling on big interstate ventures.  The banks that were in the shape to spend money 
at this time were mostly ones categorized as ‘big banks’ from large financial centers where 
they had already been used to competition.  These transactions would be a foreshadowing of 
the next few decades in the industry. 
Another unique factor in the change within the banking industry is what is known as 
the New England experiment. Prior to the 1970s, in an area of the country known for its 
close state borders and interstate transactions, laws had already been altered to allow for a 
certain amount of interstate banking.  Thrifts in the New England states were also granted 
special product powers at an earlier date than the rest of the country.  These states had more 
of a transition time and can be used as a control group to compare to the United States as a 
whole.  The process occurred more naturally than the deregulation of the entire country.  It 
7arose primarily from the needs and wants of customers in the New England states.  New 
England had a longer time to adapt and an isolated environment.  Three of the only five 
states that were able to retain their original number of banks during the 1980s were New 
England states, suggesting that this experiment was more of a success than the entire 
country. 
The simultaneous changes in the lives of Americans and the American economy 
outside of banking can not be ignored when looking at this transformation of the banking 
industry.  In the post-war years that the banking industry was relatively stable, so was 
American life.  The decades following the 1970s, though, were years of technological 
revolution and dramatic changes in methods of communication.  These two specific areas of 
growth are vital aspects of the banking industry.  They too must have had an impact on the 
structure of banking.  The American public as a whole was also going through some changes 
in the 70s.  Peace and prosperity had led to urban sprawl and technology allowed people to 
become more national and even international.  All of these differences must be looked at 
when isolating the effects of the new laws on the banking industry. 
 Finally I will take a look at the outlook for the banking industry.  Is it better or worse 
than it was prior to deregulation?  I will address the quality and quantity of banking services 
available today as opposed to 40 years ago.  How the banking industry is viewed varies 
among different people.  Many like the new changes and many feel that the industry has lost 
something.  Only time will be able to tell if the changes truly make the public better off.  
Deregulation has had one truly positive aspect, however, and that is that it has introduced 
greater economic efficiency.  The effects of deregulation have caused interest rates 
8throughout the United States to become almost exactly the same.  When looking at the 
changes this way, from a purely economic standpoint, the economy and American citizens 
have benefited from the loss of a previous market failure. 
 
9EARLY HISTORY:
Banking in the United States began with the establishment of the Bank of North 
America in Philadelphia in 17821. Up until 1836 there were only nationally chartered banks, 
but in 1837 state chartered banks were allowed and spread to many states.  From then until 
1863, all commercial banks in the US were chartered by the state in which they operated.  
There was no actual national currency, and banks obtained funds by issuing banknotes that 
were redeemable for gold.2 The National Bank Act created a new system of national banks 
chartered by the federal government.  This marked the start of the dual banking system in 
the US that still exists today.  This system of national and state banks as the only financial 
institutions lasted until 1914 with the creation of the Federal Reserve.  The Fed, as this 
became called, proved inadequate as a central bank to deal with the financial crisis brought 
on by the Great Depression.  It had few of the powers it holds today, and was ill equipped to 
deal with anything of this magnitude.  Almost half of all banks, 11,000 of 24,000, failed 
during the Great Depression, despite the Fed’s best efforts.  Bank reform in the 1930s in the 
wake of this was long overdue.  However, owing to the magnitude of the loss and fragility of 
the economy, the focus of rebuilding was on stabilization and controlling risk.  The 
government hoped that strict regulation would safeguard the faltering economy and took 
specific efforts aimed at economic growth. 
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was created in 1933 to insure 
deposits and increase liquidity within the banking system.  Other important reforms at the 
1
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time were the ceilings put on interest rates for deposits (Regulation Q) and more importantly 
geographic restrictions on banking1. These government enabled, localized monopolies 
allowed banks more profitability and less chance of closing due to heavy competition.  States 
imposed similar laws that prohibited branching and banking across state lines.  It was also at 
this time that thrift institutions, mostly Savings and Loans, were given their own set of 
regulations to focus on specific portions of the economy.  Savings Banks continued to focus 
on consumer savings, while Savings and Loans concentrated on mortgages and real estate.   
 Predictions for the economy in the years following the Great Depression were grim.  
When the second world war broke out in Europe in 1939, American GNP was barely above 
the 1929 level and unemployment was hovering around 14 percent.  But once the US began 
fighting in the war, the economy grew at unprecedented rates.  Between 1948 and 1973 the 
rate of growth of per capita GNP rose to 2.2% per year, compared to 1.8%, which had 
prevailed up to 19402. This increased growth brought the US up to par with most other 
developed nations.  It continued throughout the post-war years for decades of peaceful 
prosperity.  By 1965 S&Ls held almost half of the entire country’s home loans3. The 
housing market at the same time was also booming.  The regulations set in place allowed 
Savings and Loans to out compete commercial banks for mortgage loans and as a result, 
more money was available for housing.  By the end of the 60s, though, the return on these 
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real estate assets were not performing as well as in the past years, which became early 
encouragement for deregulation.    
The late 1960s and early 1970s were a time of great change in the United States, 
politically and economically.  The housing market began to drop off and at the same time 
inflation, which had been stable for decades, began to rise.  The years 1973-5 were the first 
severe recession since the Great Depression and became synonymous with the term 
‘stagflation.’  The high inflation and interest rates at the same time were not good for the 
economy, but did prevent major thrift and commercial bank losses.  The Carter 
administration did what it could throughout the end of the 70s, but managed to tumble the 
US further into a recession while attempting to curb inflation.  The unpopularity of the 
faltering economy partly manifested itself in unhappiness with the government and the 
beginning of deregulation was born.  It became the accepted opinion to rid the economy of 
the government control in an attempt to free the economy from the overbearing 
sluggishness of a recession.  Many felt that the government was holding the economy, and 
banks and thrifts in particular, back.    
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GEOGRAPHIC REGULATIONS:
At the dawn of the 20th century, the banking structure in the United States was very 
different than it is today.  It was based on fundamental practices and laws that governed how 
national banks and state banks were allowed to run.  First of all, banks received a charter 
from the US government or an individual state.  The bank had the option of which to 
choose, but in general banks chose state charters because of their less rigorous standards.  
Either type of bank was allowed access to the Federal Reserve System as long as a minimum 
criteria was met.  States received a fee for granting bank charters, as well as other financial 
benefits, and therefore granted banks geographic monopolies in return.  With the reforms of 
the Great Depression, most importantly the establishment of the FDIC, banks enjoyed a 
safe and highly protected banking industry.  Their local monopolies were able to experience 
high profitability, while the safeguard of new regulations gave them more lucrative products.  
In fact, most bank failures between 1940 and 1960 were due to bank fraud.1 Laws governing 
bank actions generally kept banks in positive standing. 
 The first major geographic regulations came in 1863 with the National Bank Act of 
Congress.  The branching of state banks was restricted in a hope to destroy the state 
chartering of banks and persuade state banks to apply for federal charters.2 This act was a 
means of getting more national banks to help support the Civil War because branching 
would not become a serious issue for about another 75 years.  Congress wanted an increase 
in the number of federal banks to help restore public confidence in the nation’s currency.  
1
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More National banks would also help the government pay to fight the war, because federally 
chartered banks were required to buy government bonds.  Unfortunately for Congress’ 
attempt to restructure the banking system, demand deposits were just starting to become 
popular during the war.  Checkable deposits allowed banks to make loans without issuing 
bank notes, their previous strategy.  Thanks to this, the state bank system was able to grow 
well beyond the scope of the federal banking system. 
Next in 1927, the McFadden-Pepper Act allowed national banks to set up branch 
offices in their home office cites provided that state-chartered banks possessed similar 
branching powers.1 It was later interpreted to basically outlaw national bank branching, 
which in turn had national banks running back to the state system.  Eventually the law 
became a step towards creating more competition between national and state chartered 
banks.  Six years later, as a reaction to the problems of the Great Depression the Glass-
Steagall (National Banking) Act was passed.  It evened the score between national and state 
chartered banks by stating that whatever rules there were for state banks in an individual 
state applied to national banks as well.  In turn, most states voted to prohibit all full service 
bank branching.   
This restriction of branching may have had a worsening effect on the country-wide 
depression by forcing individual banks to become dependant on a single community.  This 
fact, coupled with the crumbling of the banking system, led to a weakening of public 
resistance to bank branching.  The power to allow this, though, still rested with the states 
1
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and states were still wary of this.  It was the common conception at the time that big banks 
with many branches would lure savings away from small towns and to be invested in large 
cities.  Governments felt that this would tighten the credit available to the small towns and 
fuel the growth of big cities.  Because of this predominant thought in the states, bankers 
looked to other means. Bank holding companies – companies that held the stock of one or 
more banks – grew rapidly in popularity among larger banking firms due to certain tax and 
borrowing advantages they possessed.1
Throughout the 1930s and 40s, these companies grew in importance and became 
more of a significant force as they banded together to form large confederations.  Small 
banks feared them and large banks feared the loss of revenue of services they sold to smaller 
banks.  Under pressure from these two groups, the United States government passed the 
Bank Holding Company Act in 1956 and the Douglas Amendment to that law a year later.2
This forced BHCs to register with the Federal Reserve and allowed interstate acquisitions 
only if individual states specifically allowed it.  When the law was passed, however, no states 
allowed outside entry by holding companies and none were stepping up to offer permission.  
Existing BHCs were allowed to continue business, but the Douglas Amendment basically 
spelled the end of their expansion.  They were now limited to acquisitions only within their 
state of origin.  In 1960 the government continued with its quest to keep banks small and 
local with the Bank Merger Act.3 Any federally supervised bank was forced to have approval 
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of its principal federal supervisor in order to merge.  This was one of the final measures 
taken in an effort to avoid big banks and their adverse effects on competition. 
In addition to the geographic regulations put into place before and after the Great 
Depression, the establishment of the FDIC brought with it financial regulations that also 
affected the geography of the industry.  First there were specific pricing rules for banks and 
thrift institution, most specifically what is known as Regulation Q.  This placed limits on the 
interest banks could pay for savings deposits and the interest they could charge for loans.  It 
also prevented the payment of interest for demand deposits.  There were differences built 
into the regulation for differentiation between commercial banks and thrift institutions, 
allowing them each to be more competitive in different markets.  Additional laws were put 
into place for bank product lines.  Banks and thrifts were limited in the services they could 
offer and in the products they could sell.  These regulations helped to allow small banks to 
remain competitive and kept the banking structure relatively stable throughout the war and 
post-war years. 
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CHANGES IN AMERICAN GEOGRAPHY: 
The post-war decades in the United States were not only those of regulatory change, 
but they were also years of definitive changes in the physical geography of the country.  The 
Depression and war years saw the country focused primarily on production and 
manufacturing.  The non-agricultural portion of the American economy was greatly centered 
in cities and thus the cities were the more vital locations of the financial sector of the 
American economy.  It was at during this time that the largest and most important banks 
were located in the biggest cities: San Francisco, New York, Boston, etc.  The peace and 
prosperity of the 50s and 60s in turn saw a new focus on innovation and the service 
industries.  The city as the manufacturing center became of less importance.  This also 
became true of the city as a financial center. 
As GIs came home from war to their prefab homes and 2.5 children came the growth 
of American suburbia.  As the cities became less and less important and national focus 
shifted to families and stability, people moved out of cities into single family homes.  The 
small town became the more dominant mentality.  The affordability of automobiles and 
improvements in public transportation also helped make this possible with their aid in 
commuting.  One no longer had to live directly in a city to work and do business there.  
Increases in the quality of long-distance transportation like trains and airplanes made travel 
as a natural part of doing business more acceptable.  All of this helped banks move from 
their previous “headquarters” in the major cities into the smaller suburbs where they could 
still remain profitable.  Large banks branched, when possible, and new, single location, 
“local” banks and thrifts sprouted up all over the country to cater to this newfound market.  
17
The shifting population during the 1960s and 70s also played a role in changing the 
makeup of the banking industry.  The US population shifted toward the South, Southwest 
and West Coast and away from the New England states, the North Atlantic and Midwest.1
The banks in the northern and eastern states lost important customers and more importantly 
revenues.  These included banks with both slightly high and rather low levels of asset 
holdings.  They needed ways to reach their departing deposits and loans so they put pressure 
on the national legislature to seek opportunities to bank across state lines.  These banks also 
went to local governments to open doors to acquisitions and intrastate branching.  This shift 
of perspectives on the part of the banks themselves helped contribute to the idea of 
deregulation. 
In addition to all this, many larger banks centered in cities wanted to have a national 
presence throughout the country.  Increases in communication and interstate businesses 
made it attractive to banks to have locations in different parts of the country.  Much of the 
regulation discussed in the previous section was an attempt to hinder this process if at all 
possible.  The government wanted to prevent local bank failures that they predicted would 
happen if the large banks were allowed to compete with the smaller ones.  The regulation 
that came out of the Depression served to secure the mindset of local banks being small and 
city banks being large.  It had become the way people saw the banking industry, but was 
beginning to show its age.  Banks were starting to see that they could increase their profits 
by expanding outside of their individual monopoly. 
1
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Also within the geography of the United States is a unique case; that of the New 
England states.  These six states are some of the smallest in the country and put together are 
actually still smaller than some of the western states.  Because of the size of the states, the 
members of the state are used to traveling and doing business in states outside their home 
state on a daily basis.  It is not at all uncommon for people to live and work in separate 
states.  New England was also one of the few geographic locations within the US that 
experienced a net loss in population during the final quarter of the 20th century.  Due to this 
rare nature, laws were adapted to allow interstate banking in New England before the 
country-wide deregulation of the 1970s.  This acts as almost a control group when looking at 
deregulation of the country as a whole. 
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NEW ENGLAND EXPERIMENT:
In July 1970, a savings bank petitioned the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks for 
permission to offer a savings account that could be accessed by negotiable orders of 
withdrawal, allowing accountholders to make check-like payments to third parties.  The 
petition was initially rejected, but was turned around in the state supreme court.  Commercial 
banks were livid.  Thrifts could now pay up to 5% interest on what was for all intents and 
purposes a checking account, where banks could legally offer nothing.  Their core means of 
taking deposits was placed in jeopardy and these “NOW” accounts became a heated topic.  
Congress decided on a compromise.  The “NOW” accounts were permitted first only in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and then later in five New England states.1 Both banks 
and thrifts were able to offer these accounts, but thrifts were elated because they finally had 
access to checking accounts.  This was the first time in history that thrifts were granted 
expanded powers.   
In the later 1970s, as a part of the New England experiment, savings banks in the 
New England states were allowed to make consumer loans.  There was also a similar law in 
Texas.  The results were uninspiring.  In Texas, thrifts only had 3% of their assets in 
consumer loans and in New England the number was even lower, at 0.6%.2 Because of 
these small percentages, later advocates of diversification for thrifts would argue that 
complete expansion of powers, including commercial loans, insurance, etc., were necessary 
for thrifts to see the true benefits of deregulation. 
1
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Many years later, by 1998, deregulation was wrapping up and the banking industry 
was becoming stable once again.  Looking back, 45 states and the District of Columbia had 
all experienced extreme consolidation and a dramatic decline in the number of banking 
institutions.  Only five states, Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and Nevada were 
able to counter the tide and retain or increase the number of banks operating within their 
borders.1 It doesn’t seem like a coincidence that New England states make up three out of 
the five.  It may have been that a slower, more isolated transition eased the states into the 
deregulation and helped them weather the change.  It may also be that these states had 
always been in closer competition with each other and therefore they were also in a better 
place to adapt to deregulation.   
 
1
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CONTEMPLATION OF DEREGULATION: 
The years of the 1970s were a time in America when many things were changing, 
most specifically politically and economically.  The two are perhaps even closely related.  The 
expansionary times of the 60s were contrasted with an economic slowdown characterized 
mostly by high inflation.  Along with this came high interest rates, something that does not 
usually happen at the same time.  This became the notion of stagflation, a compound of the 
two problems that had negative effects on the economy at the time.  The popular opinion 
soon became that the big government could not stop the downward economic spiral.  
Productivity was falling and businesses were not doing well.  This led to behavior changes by 
both banks, their depositors and their borrowers.  Technology was also starting to open new 
doors to cost-saving techniques that had never even been dreamt of.  At the same time new 
financial products and services were being developed from within and outside of the banking 
industry.1 These started to encroach on the business of banking.  Deregulation of the 
banking industry seemed like a step to take care of all of these problems.  Its supporters 
claimed that an infusion of entrepreneurship and innovation into the industry was all that 
was needed.  The regulations were holding back competition and were therefore holding 
back true advancement and expansion in banking. 
Those lobbying for change and promoting deregulation had many important 
arguments.  The first was that deregulation would lead to diversification and expansion.  The 
demand for mortgages had been reduced because the numbers of these loans were increased 
1
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through securitization, so it was thought that if thrifts could move into shorter-term lending, 
they would be better suited to deal with the future.  As credit cards, insurance and second 
mortgages were becoming more popular it was also felt that the more types of banks that 
dealt in these products, the more competition there would be.1 Many people also felt that 
thrift institutions and their federally granted status were simply outmoded.  Part of the plea 
for deregulation was a scheme of modernization.  It was a widely held belief at this point in 
history that “government regulation impedes progress” and many felt that progress in the 
banking industry was greatly needed.2
The stagflation of the 70s also seemed to be on the side of those favoring 
deregulation.  Normally during recessionary times rising interest rates are coupled with 
falling inflation, but this time it was not the case.  The rising interest rates and the 
uncharacteristic inflation rates were hurting banks.  High and unexpected inflation negatively 
impacts banks but positively affects borrowers.  Money paid back to the bank is worth less 
than it was when borrowed, even when counting the interest rate.  The high interest rates 
were also actually hurting banks at this time.  Regulation Q had been enacted in 1933, but 
did not become restrictive until 1966.3 By the 70s, interest rates had risen well beyond the 
ceilings allowed.  When this happened, savings migrated out of thrift institutions resulting in 
a crunch in the mortgage market.  This process, called disintermediation, brought money 
into financial institutions not governed by Regulation Q, who could offer high-rate products.  
1
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Both thrifts and commercial banks felt the squeeze created by disintermediation.  Many 
proponents of deregulation felt that mortgage demand would go unmet and thrifts would 
suffer unless they were allowed to take advantage of the rising interest rates. 
Lastly, geographic deregulation seemed a necessary counterpart to monetary 
deregulation.  To proponents it seemed only natural to allow geographic diversification along 
with product and interest rate expansion.  It would allow banks a better chance in a more 
competitive market and keep them from remaining dependent on their local community.  
Geographic deregulation was also seen as a method of stabilizing the industry once it started 
to go through rough times.  Those in favor argued that banks organized in branch-banking 
structures have historically tended to be more stable and to experience fewer disruptions 
from runs and panics than unit banks.1 Bank branching was also seen as something that 
could only help the faltering industry. 
Opponents of deregulation also had convincing arguments.  Most were simply 
devoted to Regulation Q.  They felt that this long standing regulation was the only way for 
small banks and thrift institutions to attract savings, and without this the nation’s demand 
for home mortgages would go unmet.  Also, thrifts themselves argued that they had no 
experience with the supposed diversifying products.  Unfamiliar assets presented unfamiliar 
risks.  They felt that the large banks could more than meet the need for these items and that 
their market remained in the savings and home loan areas.  A large portion of the dissenting 
deregulation opinion also held the belief that the natural monopolies were still needed.  
1
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These people judged that economies of scope still existed, even in the changed geographic 
environment.  In order for small banks to remain in business they needed geographic and 
regulatory protection. 
Regardless of the two differing opinions, it was obvious that there was change 
brewing from within the industry.  Most large banks had taken many steps throughout the 
1960s to avoid or go outside of Fed regulations.  They developed repurchase agreements, 
used negotiable CDs and commercial paper in efforts to be competitive with high interest 
rates.  In 1972, however, money market mutual funds emerged as an opportunity for 
consumers to benefit from the market interest rates.  These were in essence demand 
deposits, with check writing abilities (though usually requiring a minimum check size).  
Customers did have to give up their deposit protection, as these are not insured, but they 
were able to reap benefits from rising market rates.1 More and more banks in certain states 
began issuing negotiable order of withdrawal, “NOW” accounts, which had been offered in 
New England for a few years.  Based on this, and the steps banks were already taking to 
remain competitive, Congress passed a law in 1980 allowing all thrifts and banks to issue 
NOW accounts and began a six-year phase-out of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings.2 Thus 
began the deregulation of the banking industry. 
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DEREGULATION: 
The financial reforms of 1980 did not develop out of thin air.  They came as a 
reaction to and an affirmation of the tactics banks had been utilizing for years.  Inflation, 
high interest rates, money market funds and changes in savings had rendered deposit 
restrictions obsolete.1 The 1970s had already seen amendments to the Bank Holding 
Company Act that broadened the exceptions to the prohibition against bank holding 
companies engaging in non-banking activities.  One of the new amendments was to define a 
bank specifically as an institution accepting demand deposits and making commercial loans.2
This allowed non-banks to acquire banks and spin off either deposit taking or loan 
operations and then continue to work out from under restrictions on banks.  Banks and 
non-banks alike were taking matters into their own hands to utilize and profit from the high 
interest rates and new products available throughout the 70s. 
The Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Act (DIMCA) of 1980 was aimed 
at phasing out deposit rate ceilings and bolstering the competitiveness of thrift institutions.  
It instituted five main reforms: it established the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
Committee to phase out deposit rate ceilings by 1986, it authorized NOW accounts for 
individuals and nonprofits, it permitted savings and loans to make real estate loans, 
consumer loans and certain investments, it approved credit card lending and trust activities 
for savings and loans and finally it allowed thrifts to invest 3 percent of assets in “service” 
subsidiaries, up from 1 percent.  DIMCA blurred the lines even further between commercial 
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banks and thrift institutions and also served to increase competition even further within the 
entire banking industry.  The most important change to come from this would be the 
authorization of commercial real estate loans to thrifts.1 This infused a new aspect of risk 
for thrift institutions.  These new types of loans for thrifts would affect not only the 
competition of the whole industry, but the geography of banking in the US.  
Throughout the 1970s banks had not only circumvented deposit and product 
regulations, but they also tried to evade geographic regulations.  Market pressures for 
increased services over an increased area led large banks to establish “loan production 
offices” outside their home states.  These were legal since they did not engage in banking 
and simply arranged for the home office to make the loan or accept the deposit.2 The 
difference between this and branching, however, was in essence negligible.  As banks and 
thrifts began to experience trouble in the late 70s and early 80s, bank holding companies 
were able to acquire banks as well as non-banking subsidiaries in other states.  Once they 
had a presence in another state they were allowed to expand within that state as well.  Credit 
cards were also another way banks started to gain a presence in states other than their home 
base and compete in a national market.  Banks used the same tactics for avoiding geographic 
regulations as they did for deposit regulations.  With the losses of competitive advantage due 
to all the previous deregulation, banks were looking for new outlets.   
Two years after the passage of DIMCA Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act.  It broadened the asset powers of thrift institutions and also 
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authorized all banks to establish money market deposit accounts which were competitive to 
money market mutual funds, yet insured by the FDIC.1 It took one of the first steps toward 
geographic deregulation when it authorized various actions by regulatory agencies to assist 
troubled institutions and approved emergency acquisitions across state lines.2 It seemed  to 
them that removing some of the interstate banking barriers set up over 50 years previous 
would be less harmful to the system as a whole than the FDIC racking up substantial bailout 
costs and having to deal with industry disturbances.  No one wanted consumers to lose faith 
in the industry at such a crucial time. 
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 for the 
most part completed the geographic deregulation of the banking industry at the national 
level.  While some intrastate branching restrictions do actually still remain in place, American 
banks were allowed to avail themselves of the whole nation without any interstate restraints.3
The last decade of the 20th century then became the era of US banking consolidation.  Large 
banks had been waiting for this chance to expand and gain new markets.  Consumers in this 
modern era were also showing interest in the conveniences that interstate banking could 
offer.  As people moved more and more, banks needed to be able to keep up with their 
customer sprawl in order to increase, as well as to simply retain their customer base.  Banks 
also wanted to improve their safety and profits by expanding their asset size and diversifying 
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their product lines.1 In an increasingly international business, American banks needed to 
compete with international banks that often operated in less regulated and more supportive 
systems.  Lastly, economies of scale were found to have significant importance in banks as 
there is a decline in average cost per unit of asset with a bank size up to $75 million in 
assets.2 It became common thought that larger banks would benefit both consumers and 
the economy with improved products and lower costs. 
The Riegle-Neal Act dealt with five areas of interstate banking and branching activity.  
It allowed BHCs to acquire banks in all states and states were not allowed to interfere or 
discriminate against out of state companies.  There was, however, also a provision in place to 
protect banks under 5 years old from out of state acquisition.  These BHC acquisitions took 
place under merger guidelines that did not allow a BHC to acquire more than 30% of the 
market share in a single state or 10% in the nation.  The Riegle-Neal Act also allowed for 
individual banks to seek regulatory approval to merge across state lines.  The same market 
share provisions were taken into account.  The third provision in the act was for the 
allowance of de novo, meaning new opening, branching into another state if the state 
approved the activity.  Fourth, the act allowed for foreign banks to enter and branch within 
the United States provided they comply with certain provisions.  Lastly, banks from different 
states were allowed to affiliate.3 These rules immediately affected the landscape of the 
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American banking industry by encouraging concentration and the expansion of big banks 
out of the big cities. 
Another important factor in the increasing consolidation of banks, outside of only 
geographic deregulation, was the support by regulators of mergers and acquisitions.  Healthy 
banks taking over or purchasing declining banks was seen as a way to avoid the problems of 
the previous decades and to reduce the FDIC failure rate.  After the end of Regulation Q, 
many smaller banks had trouble competing to obtain funds and were encouraged to merge 
or sell in order to remain alive.  The Fed and FDIC did not want the bank failures of the 70s 
to spiral any further into a national banking crisis.  The sacrifice of some larger banks gaining 
market shares was nothing next to the threat of losing even more banks completely to the 
increased competition.  It also became accepted that maybe medium sized banks would be 
more sustainable in the long run.  The regulators realized too, that earlier laws had made 
banks too dependent on an individual town or community and their economic situation.  By 
allowing banks to expand their geographic area, banks were able to diversify and their risk of 
failure was dramatically reduced. 
At the same time, although the banking industry was undergoing a revolution, a few 
long standing laws did remain in place.  Minimum capital requirements and reserve 
requirements still exist, as does deposit insurance on most bank services.  Numbers have 
only changed throughout the years as an obvious adjustment for inflation and changes in 
personal habits, etc.  The methods at which banks borrow money from the Fed and each 
other have also remained constant since the establishment of the Federal Reserve and FDIC.  
The dual system of having state and nationally chartered banks also remains, although the 
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ratio of national to state banks has increased dramatically since the Great Depression.  States 
bank law making powers have declined, but each state still holds the prerogative to make 
many banking decisions under the federal government.  The fundamental banking system 
does still remain in place, only some of the rules and players have changed. 
 
31
SIMULTANEOUS CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY: 
The 1970s and 80s saw an extreme amount of changes throughout the banking 
industry, and the following decades saw equally as many.  Most of these were brought about 
by banks themselves or by the US government who regulates them, but these were not the 
only changes that precipitated the alteration of the banking structure.  Numerous other 
economic, political and external factors helped to change American lifestyles and ways of 
doing business.  These had an enormous effect on the entire country as well as the banking 
industry.  Perhaps the most obvious change from the 70s on was the development of 
computers.  Their reach left almost no industry or company untouched.   
Computers, and more specifically the invention of the internet, served to basically 
revolutionize how business was done, and they especially impacted banking.  These new 
technologies made branching especially important to banks because they could spread out 
their locations while keeping their information central.  It also made branches more 
attractive to consumers because each branch was identical to the main office in regards to 
the information and services available.  Deposits made at any branch were instantly 
recognized at another branch.  Banks could more easily expand within their state and into 
other states because the internet made distance for the most part irrelevant.  From a 
consumer standpoint, once banking became computerized it was streamlined and simplified.  
Customer convenience also became an important competitive factor.  By the end of the 
1980s competition had rendered banks so similar in their offerings and services that 
customer service became a differentiating factor.  People wanted easy access to their money 
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and this meant many local branches and ATMs.  These factors, in addition to new laws, were 
a large part of the motivation for banks to expand geographically. 
Another competitive factor in the geographic expansion of the banking industry was 
the new development of financial institutions in the late 70s.  As the economy was receding, 
consumers were becoming more savvy with their money.  Many were not content to simply 
let their money sit in a savings account earning minimal interest, or leave the bulk of their 
money in checking accounts bearing no interest at all.  Investing as a way to earn money 
became more common as consumers wanted to get the most from their money.  Financial 
institutions that were not considered banks grew as a market in response to this demand.  
Banks in turn faced increasing competition for deposits with which they made their profits.  
This was some of the impetus behind the development of money market mutual funds and 
NOW accounts that really changed the ways banks did business.  Geographically also, banks 
were forced to turn away from only their local deposit base and reach as far as they possibly 
could to gain additional deposits. 
Inflation also helped to increase the pressures on banks to expand their products as 
well as their customer base.  As the 1980s opened, inflation rates and interest rates were 
soaring everywhere as a result of the second oil price shock.1 The Federal Reserve was 
trying to contain the mounting inflation with tight monetary policies as the US and the world 
experienced its worst recession since World War II.  Budget deficits in the US helped to 
keep domestic interest rates also at a relatively high level.  This, combined with economic 
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confidence in the later half of the 80s, led to the raise in value of the dollar and a surge in 
imports.  Exports also fell and in a few years America had become the world’s largest debtor, 
also increasing inflation. 
Another important outside factor in the geographic deregulation and consequent 
expansion of the banking industry was the political climate at the time.  The Carter and Ford 
administrations had the prosperous 60s looming over their heads when they came into office 
during recessionary times.  Gerald Ford struggled under the weight of the Nixon scandal and 
the Vietnam war and was unable to enact any policy measures to counteract inflation or the 
mounting energy crisis.  As Jimmy Carter came into office things were simply getting worse.  
He had inherited Nixon’s price fixing efforts and kept them in place, causing some of the 
shortages that led to problems in the 70s.  He did, however, initiate the launch of 
deregulation with the airline and trucking industries, which got the ball rolling on further 
deregulation.  Ronald Reagan was the man who came in at the brink of the Savings and Loan 
crisis with the idea that “big government” was the blame for the problems with the 
economy.  He continued the deregulation of the banking industry, but also was reducing 
income taxes at the same time.  This led to a deep recession in the early 80s which had dire 
consequences for a majority of the banking industry. 
Along with the specific political leanings of the time, there was a general global trend 
toward privatization of economies.  Newly elected governments in the United Kingdom, 
Canada and France were all ideologically in favor of free market economies.  They all started 
taking steps towards loosening regulations in their own countries.  Europe and the United 
States were also putting pressure on some countries, especially Japan, to remove their 
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government constraints on foreign financial products and to become less involved in their 
own banking system.1 Deregulation was becoming more of an international philosophy that 
was intended to benefit economies all over the world. 
Lastly, the late 1980s and the coming of age of Generation X saw a great change in 
consumer culture.  Giant malls and superstores replaced the local grocery and retail stores as 
the mainstay of American life.  “Bigger is better” became the consumption attitude, and this 
began to apply even to banks.  Customers began to see convenience as a crucial factor in 
business and banks were looking for whatever they could do to stay competitive.  Offering 
many branch locations and later many ATM locations seemed incredibly important.  A bank 
that was able to offer banking near a customers house and office and places they would 
travel certainly had an edge.  The nostalgia for the local bank with the teller customers had 
known for years wasn’t so appealing any longer.  Large banks that could offer a plethora of 
products under one roof and service a large geographic area became popular and this helped 
reduce branching taboo.  The public began to feel that competition was good for the 
industry and that fewer geographic restrictions would benefit the consumer. 
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INITIAL EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION: 
Deregulation began as an attempt to bring about changes in the banking industry at a 
time when people in charge thought that things could only get better.  The economy was 
sluggish and it seemed that banks had unrealized potential that could be accessed through 
deregulation.  The initial effects of the new laws of the early 80s, however, really did very 
little to make things better for a majority of banks and thrift institutions.   
The new laws of the late 70s made real estate loans more important for banks and 
thrifts and as a result became a large part of their lending portfolios.  Commercial and 
private home mortgages were very important to the livelihood of banks in this era.  Many 
had also begun selling their services outside of their local territories to remain competitive.  
This newfound reliance on mortgages did not leave banks in a good position to weather the 
first half of the 1980s.  Housing starts and sales, both new and existing had peaked in 1978.  
Starts went from a little over 2 million in 1978 to roughly 1.2 million in 1980, a decline of 36 
percent.1 Sales of new housing fell 40 percent as starts reached postwar lows in 1981 and 
1982.  This was all exacerbated by the extraordinarily high interest rates, with the prime rate 
hitting its 20.5% peak in 1981.  Rates began falling but not down to previously normal levels.  
These problems with the housing and real estate markets did not do anything to alleviate the 
problems that banks and thrift institutions were having already. 
The number of savings and loans and savings banks started to fall from 1980 to 1982, 
with savings banks declining from 323 to 315 and savings and loans having more problems 
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and falling from 4,613 to 3,825. 1 While total thrift assets actually did continue to rise, 
earnings fell dramatically for the first time since the Great Depression.  The savings and loan 
industry lost $4.6 billion after-tax in 1981 and $4.3 billion in 1982.  Their return on net 
worth dropped over 15% in both ‘81 and ‘82. 2 The problem here was the decline of the 
interest rate spread that eventually became negative.  Mutual funds had lured away high-
depositors and forced banks to offer close to market interest rates.  The secondary mortgage 
market reduced yields on loans and banks were taking on adjustable rate mortgages with 
short-term losses in hopes of long term gains.3 Banks were receiving rates close to what they 
were giving, sometimes even lower.  Only borrowings from the Federal Home Loan banks 
enabled them to survive.  The combination of external forces and stiff competition due to 
deregulation did not look good for the thrift industry. 
Another change relating directly to deregulation was the continued reliance on 
securities by commercial banks.  Banks were securitizing loans through Ginnie Mae and 
many other residential mortgage pass through programs as a way to gain a competitive edge 
or remain competitive in the tighter markets.  Large banks were looking to the Eurodollar 
market and foreign loans for increased securities.  Small banks would purchase participation 
in these foreign loans as another way to securitize.  These new developments meant a shift 
of their income from interest on assets to fees for off-balance sheet services.4 This started a 
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radical change in banks relationships with customers.  Individual consumers now had more 
freedom of choice with which bank they dealt with for different products and services. This 
was at the same time that interest-free demand deposits were declining in importance to 
banks.  These all served to increase uncertainty for banks in terms of both customer base 
and future funds. 
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INDUSTRY REACTION: 
The industry had obviously been changing for many years prior to the actual new 
deregulation laws.  Banks and thrifts were reacting to changing economic conditions and in 
turn laws were made to thwart these actions or help stabilize the industry in the aftermath.  
After deregulation, though, banks and thrifts started changing now as a result of the new 
laws and the changing conditions the laws brought with them.  The most notable change 
that deregulation caused was the stiffening of inter-bank competition.  Closely related, the 
new regulations gave banks the first real chance to expand geographically and in essence at 
all.  Banks and thrifts alike took advantage of these legal spurs to make further changes to 
their business practices. 
As early as 1981 banks and thrifts began capitalizing on the new legislation in hopes 
to make the big changes positive ones.  Construction and commercial real estate loans that 
took advantage of the lower interest rates were the first products to get heavily marketed and 
in turn their numbers greatly increased.  Commercial real estate lending is one of the riskiest 
and least diversifiable investments that a bank can make.1 As there were now more players 
in the loan market with the addition of thrifts and expanded products, competition also 
increased.  The new competition sent banks and especially thrift institutions into risky loan 
territory where they hoped to make the most profit while charging higher interest rates.  
Commercial banks were adding to their risk by lending to less credit worthy foreign 
companies and also by being satisfied with lower net worths.2 In addition to competition for 
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all the different types of loans, deposits also became scarce with the development of CDs 
and Money Market accounts.  Many banks and thrifts were forced to become content with 
lower deposit levels.  It became important to banks to eke out whatever profits were to be 
made, wherever they could find them.  These early practices, started with little experience of 
banking in a deregulated industry, would serve to later be the downfall of many banks in 
many situations. 
One positive aspect of the industry reaction to deregulation was the increase in inter-
bank and even intra-bank efficiency.  As competition for deposits and loans increased, so did 
competition in other areas of banking.  Operational costs became more expensive as banks 
competed for personnel and raced for the better and newer equipment.  Banks sought to 
increase efficiency within the branch to reduce costs as well as increasing efficiency between 
banks to better compete and also reduce costs.1 Banks found new ways to promote and 
deliver their services that cost them less money as well as invested in more effective 
computer tools.  In 1980 there were less than 20,000 ATMs in service in the United States 
accounting for less than $50 billion in banking transactions, but by 1994 the number had 
climbed to 110,000 with ATMs totaling $560 billion in transaction volume.2 As ATMs were 
becoming more popular so also was telephone and computer banking.  Competition, and 
admittedly also technological awakening, was spurring many new industry led changes. 
Perhaps directly because of earlier deregulation, most banks jumped at the new 
geographical chances offered to them in the second rounds of new legislation.  With 
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competition increasing in every other aspect, the removal of the geographic monopoly was 
almost a relief.  Banks used branching to allow them to enter new markets to explore new 
sources of revenue.  They no longer felt the need to be protected, but wanted room to 
compete in the changing industry and took full advantage of it.  Even with the rapid ATM 
growth, full-service branch numbers rose from less than 46,000 in 1980 to over 60,000 in 
1994.1 Branches became the new key to customer service and expanded product lines.  
Increases in technology only served to help expand and quicken the pace of the geographical 
expansion of the banking industry.   
Many banks that were affiliated in different states were able to finally merge into one 
legal entity.  By converting one bank into the headquarters and subsequent banks into pure 
branches, duplicate staffs and tiers were able to be eliminated at great cost savings to all.  
Reductions in operating costs were also experienced thanks to consolidation of data 
processing and facilities.  Mergers also became popular because of the unique banking 
characteristic of excess returns for stockholders on both sides of the negotiation table.2
There was incredible financial incentive all around for banks to merge and cut costs and thus 
become more competitive. 
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BANK FAILURES: 
As much as it was the industry reacting to the changes of new legislation, banks and 
thrifts were basically at the mercy of a revolutionized industry.  The mid 1980s were the 
worst years for the banking industry since the Great Depression.  The drastic increase in 
competition in the industry caused a shake up that not all banks could weather.  The only 
things preventing another national depression were government spending measures and the 
fact that the service industry made up a greater part of the economy.  The government also 
was using banks as more of an anti-deflationary tool at this time.  Banks overzealous loan 
making increased investment and consumption, in turn helping to counter deflation. 1 In the 
years following the Great Depression banks failed at rates less than 90 banks a year.  The 
industry and the country itself no doubt expanded in the next 40 years, but bank failures 
topping 200 per year between 1983 and 1995 were a unique crisis.2 As profit margins shrank 
due to increased competition within the industry, there became no margin for error in the 
business.  Risk was an inherent part of the industry, and loans had failed as long as there had 
been banks, but the cushion was gone.  Banks were no longer making as much on the good 
loans to cover themselves when some loans did go bad.  Add to that an increased reliance on 
risk taking and this led to more problems.  
With the decreasing profitability of the traditional banking business, commercial 
banks were seeking new ways to keep business up.  Banks and thrifts alike had many risky 
loans and were facing incredible competition for deposits.  Many of the loans made in the 
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late 70s were made on the expectation of future growth and rapid inflation.  When these 
were both not experienced to the degree hoped, many home owners and even large business 
defaulted leaving the banks holding the bag.  The existence of deposit insurance increased 
moral hazard for banks to take on more risky endeavors.  Depositors had little incentive to 
keep banks from making uncertain loans because they were insured against any losses.  Also, 
the continued decline in housing demand was undermining the dependence of banks and 
thrifts on mortgage loans.  Foreign investors were also defaulting in large numbers due to 
the worldwide recession and the increase in risk that banks took on inevitably led to 
increases in losses.  In efforts to help, the government kept increasing thrift and bank 
powers by deregulating, but this help ended up backfiring. 
The fact that the largest number of banks failed since the 1930s and the huge amount 
of problems experienced by thrift institutions gave these years the “savings and loan crisis” 
nickname.  The savings and loan industry lost over 8 billion dollars between 1981 and 82.1
Some commercial banks also closed, and many if not most of those that remained had 
drastically reduced credit ratings.  These included some of the nations largest.  The problems 
unique to thrift institutions were often directly related to the expanded powers granted by 
deregulation.  When their assets were expanded to include commercial loans, real estate 
loans and consumer loans they were instantly able to take on more risk without the benefit 
of any prior experience.  Banks had been dealing with these types of loans since their 
establishment and still had problems with risk.  S&Ls had little knowledge of how to 
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accurately gauge risk and as a result got into more trouble with bad loans.  In addition to this 
problem, in the thick of the crisis, as the loans started to go bad, thrifts actually made things 
worse.  As they started losing money from initial bad loans, many thrifts tried to issue more 
short-term risky loans in an attempt to cover these losses.  This nothing-to-lose attitude 
contributed directly to the excessive risk that caused so many thrift institutions to fail. 
An important factor to note is the makeup of the banks that failed.  The total number 
of independent banking organizations fell from 12,463 in 1979 to 7,926 in 1994, for a net 
loss of 4,537 banks.  More specifically, 4,378 institutions classified as “small banking 
organizations” disappeared during this period.1 Almost all of the reduction in total banks is 
explained by the reduction in number of small organizations.  Since the gross assets of the 
industry did not fall during this time, there was a serious shift of assets from small banks to 
large ones.  This just shows that the crisis not only caused the decline of many banks, but it 
also caused a good portion of the industry consolidation into large organizations.  Because 
of the differences in nature of the two types of banks, the nature of the industry changed as 
well. 
After all these problems it would have made sense to close the insolvent Savings and 
Loans and stop the cycle of bad loans.  Banks and thrifts, however, are not normal business 
endeavors that can go bankrupt and drop easily out of the industry when they go out of 
business.  Again, thanks to deposit insurance, their customers are protected and the 
government is required to pay for deposits that a bank cannot cover.  This left the 
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government in a tough position.  They had incentive to keep the insolvent banks open if 
only to prevent them from having to pay out large sums.  The regulators chose to maintain a 
stance of regulatory forbearance in which they refrained from closing indebted banks which 
was their right.1 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Fund, later abolished in 1989, 
adopted lower capital requirements and allowed expertise and other intangible assets, called 
goodwill, to be listed as capital.  The main reasons that the FSLIC maintained this stance 
were due to its close relationship with the thrifts themselves.  The FSLIC was created to 
encourage growth of S&Ls and thus it was difficult for regulators who were very close to 
these institutions to shut them down.  It was also hard for the regulators to admit to such a 
large scale failure. 
The practice of regulatory forbearance did little if anything to help out the failing 
thrifts.  It simply gave them another chance to take bigger risks in hopes of one last big 
payoff.  While some S&Ls did make money, too many did not receive the payout to the risks 
they had taken.  The bigger downside was that failing banks were offering high interest rate 
deposits and below-market interest rate loans as a last ditch effort.  This in turn took a toll 
on healthy banks.  Healthy S&Ls were struggling to compete against failing ones offering 
impossible rates.  This did nothing to help the industry as a whole and just made all banks 
less profitable.  Losses continued to mount year after year as this gambling could no longer 
be maintained.  
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FEDERAL REACTION: 
The government and the Federal Reserve could see early on that deregulation and the 
combination of other simultaneous factors had an effect on the banking industry.  Banks and 
thrift institutions alike were changing the methods they used to do business and the products 
and services they chose to offer.  The way the government was deciding to respond to these 
trends was changing as well.  They had the real power to control how they would let the 
crisis affect the industry. 
The 1970s were largely a time of change.  The political powers in place by the end of 
the decade were no longer in favor of keeping the status quo.  Deregulation in its onset was 
seen as a type of reform that would be exactly what everyone thought they wanted.  Shaking 
up the banking industry seemed to be the way to go, initially.  It was thought that some new 
competition would increase the benefits to consumers and help the industry to grow.  But it 
soon became very apparent that while some consumers may be gaining and some banks 
might be flourishing, a vast majority of banks were losing profits and several were facing 
insolvency.   
The problems the economy itself was having were not helping the government gain 
the control they desired to see the intended results.  The federal government risked looking 
weak and having the public lose confidence in the economy and banking system if the 
problems were allowed to exacerbate.  They also risked losing control of the whole industry 
and having to deal with a crisis on par with the Great Depression.  Some sacrifices were 
made, and the landscape of the industry would never look the same again, but thanks to the 
actions taken by the federal government the banking industry itself was able to remain alive 
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relatively unscathed except for a small blip on the historical radar.  It took the government a 
few years and a couple of tires, but consumers were able to continue their business as 
though nothing had happened and confidence in the economy only grew stronger. 
One important factor in the government’s reaction to the banking problems facing 
them at this time, the mid-1980s, was the fact that the government is responsible for the 
economy as a whole as well as banks and also that the banks have a direct effect on the 
economy in return.  In times of economic recession, the government chooses to lower 
interest rates to get citizens to invest and in essence to increase the money supply.  By doing 
this the government is trying to control inflation and let the economy grow at a sustainable 
rate, but during this time they were hurting banks.  Banks faced even stiffer competition for 
deposits with lower interest rates and the interest rate spread remained extremely low.  When 
banks have a hard time getting deposits, they are able to offer fewer loans.  This also lowers 
investment and if there are fewer banks in operation it does not help.  This put the 
government in a tough position of trying to balance different interests that all had the 
potential to affect the economy as a whole. 
Banks were not directly controlled by the federal government, but by federal agencies 
designed to look after different types of banks.  The insurance corporations created during 
the Great Depression were not only for consumer protection.  They were established to 
serve the banks they protected, the federal government and the economy itself.  During the 
banking problems of the 80s, these became conflicting interests.  The FSLIC needed to help 
the banks that were failing, while at the same time not bankrupt the government.  They also 
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did not want to see their sole reason for existence get wiped out of the economy.  A rash of 
bank closings would also not bode well for public opinion of thrifts.   
These regulatory agencies were perhaps in actuality too close to the banks.  Their 
initial actions seemed only to compound the problem, not help it.  They could have 
suspended new charters and acquisitions until the so-called crisis passed, but instead they 
chose to continue as normal.  In 1981 and 82 the FSLIC approved 61 new charters in 
California alone and scores of mergers and acquisitions between failing banks who had 
intentions to gamble with funds.1 Instead of accepting the bankruptcy of the problem 
banks, the FSLIC attempted to try and prop up the industry by encouraging relatively 
healthy ones to purchase or merge with the ailing ones.  They not only encouraged 
consolidation of the industry but thought it would help alleviate the crisis.  Fewer, larger 
firms seemed like they would be more efficient and equipped to deal with the changes that 
were occurring within the industry.  Banks that were so badly off as to not even be able to 
merge were actually taken over by the FSLIC in order to keep them alive because their 
liquidation would have more than exhausted the insurance fund.2 These were often small 
banks in rural areas.  Once helped out of insolvency the FSLIC offered them for sale at 
modest cost to large city banks who purchased them to extend their presence outside of the 
cities.   
By 1986 the FSLIC stalling tactics were not doing much to help the Savings and Loan 
crisis and many banks were doing worse.  “Just helping out” was not working as bank losses 
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were mounting.  The FSLIC was in essence bankrupt.  The Reagan administration sought 
$15 billion to aid the industry, a sum that was only a fraction of the total amount it would 
cost to close all insolvent S&Ls.  Congress, however, in the Competitive Equality in Banking 
Act of 1987, allowed only $10.8 billion for the FSLIC to borrow.1 The act included 
provisions directly encouraging regulatory forbearance (the allowance of failing banks to 
remain open).  Congress did not want to deal with the real problem that bank failures were 
climbing and loses were mounting well beyond the money they had appropriated.   
Two years later the first Bush administration decided to finally take decisive action to 
close insolvent S&Ls and prevent further problems.  His resulting legislation, the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, made major new provisions to the 
regulatory bodies of the banking industry.2 The FSLIC and Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
were both eliminated since they had failed in their regulatory tasks.  The FDIC then became 
the sole administrator of federal deposit insurance.  This was really one of the final steps 
toward making thrifts and commercial banks as indistinguishable as they are today.  The act 
also reinstated pre-1982 asset limits for thrifts and created the Resolution Trust Corporation 
to resolve and sell the real estate of failed institutions.  It was actually able to sell over 95% 
of the actual buildings, most to healthy commercial banks.  Some of the capital from the 
defunct regulatory agencies was also sold to existing banks.  While this was a very serious 
effort to deal with the surmounting problem, there was still no attempt to fix the adverse 
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selection and moral hazard problems created by deposit insurance.  They did however 
initiate a federal study into the matter. 
This study was completed in 1991 and resulted in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act.  This classified banks into 5 groups based on their capital 
holdings with class 1 being “well capitalized” and class 5 as “critically undercapitalized.”  The 
FDIC did also institute a risk-based insurance premium, but it still hasn’t proved its validity 
More than 90% of banks holding over 95% of deposits all pay the same premium.  Lastly, 
the act strengthened the Fed’s authority to supervise foreign banks.1 This left American 
banks in a better position to compete with international banks and gave them incentive to 
expand internationally.  These new provisions all showed a bias toward the new wave of big 
banks.  The classification system was weighted towards larger banks as well as the new 
insurance premiums.  This distinct “too big to fail” preference that came into play in the 
early 1990s definitely influenced the following decade of industry consolidation and 
infiltration by the bank giants. 
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GEOGRAPHY OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
The one main result of deregulation and the consequent reactions was a drastically 
changed banking industry.  Gone were the days of the local bank, credit union or savings 
and loan.  By the end of the 1990s and the turn of the 21st century banks in some towns 
were changing hands a couple of times in one year.  A bank that started as a one branch 
institution in North Carolina was suddenly popping up in cities all over the Midwest, the 
West coast and New England.  More services than ever before were being offered under one 
roof, instead of simply loans and deposits.  Technology revolutionized the way customers 
interacted with the bank itself and competition became supremely fierce.  Many of these 
things happened to the banking industry, but a good number of the changes seen in the 21st 
century banking industry were thanks to measures taken by the banks themselves. 
One marked difference that banks see in the 21st century is the increased focus on 
globalization.  Many banks have branches in multiple countries or are at the very least 
affiliated with other banks internationally.  This can largely be attributed to the rise in 
globalization in almost all business industries.  The increase in trade with other nations since 
the 1960s helped this, as did the high interest rates of the 1970s which brought investment 
from abroad to the United States.  The move by the US in the early 70s from fixed to 
floating exchange rates put pressure on foreign currency against the dollar and tied foreign 
economies doing business with the US closer to our economy.  This made it easier and more 
efficient to bank in other countries.  The speed at which money moves now, in the 21st 
century, makes a big difference in international banking.  The internet and the rapid motion 
of exchange and interest rates make international banking not only extremely profitable, but 
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also quick and easy.  Lastly, as countries become more integrated in their retail and 
manufacturing businesses, financial services necessarily becoming more united.1 A very large 
number of the world’s largest corporations are stationed in multiple countries throughout 
the globe.  Countries are becoming more and more tied together through their economies 
and banks are unavoidably a part of the package. 
An important part of the expansion of the banking industry into an international 
endeavor is the technology available in the 21st century.  Now, more than ever before, the 
banking industry is the leader in the latest technology.  In an increasingly competitive 
industry banks have turned to technology to entice customers.  The ability of certain banks 
to perform more and more functions via computer or ATM has become a selling point.  It 
also has become a way for banks to cut costs by hiring fewer employees and having their 
systems be automated.  This can also be a double-edged sword.  While 40 years ago not 
dealing with a person would be unheard of, today finding a person to talk to in a bank is 
somewhat of a joke.  Automation seemed, for a while in the late 1990s, to be the wave of the 
future, but the use of technology seems to have backfired today.  More and more companies 
are advertising their hands-on, people oriented, “old fashioned” approach to banking.  It 
seems that some consumers are fed up with what they consider the overuse of technology 
and that there are some things that truly cannot be replaced by a computer. 
Technology has also had a direct effect on the consumers by leading them to expect 
more from their banks than ever before.  No one is willing to go without access to their 
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money at anytime.  Banks are open much longer and expanded hours than ever before and 
have all kinds of convenience branches in supermarkets and other stores.  Whereas 25 years 
ago customers would go into a branch on Friday afternoon to cash a check that would last 
them for the weekend, customers today have access to their money relatively anywhere 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week.  The general public has also become much more savvy in their 
view of bank services.  The corner bank doesn’t draw the loyalty it used to as more 
consumers are able to go online or shop around for the best CD rate or lowest mortgage 
rate.  Having sometimes three or four different banks within blocks of each other helps the 
customer shop to get the best money for his or her dollar.  Consumers now expect to go to 
the best bank that can help them with their needs as opposed to doing all their business 
primarily with their local bank. 
Added to these changes are the two more obvious, but perhaps overlooked changes 
in the face of the banking industry: size and location.  Larger, interstate and international 
banks are quickly becoming the norm instead of the exception.  This became apparent even 
in the early years of interstate deregulation.  In 1980 the top 10 banks held only 21% of the 
nations commercial banking assets, but by only 1995 they were approaching 30%.1 It has 
only grown since.  The actual numbers make it even more clear. In 1990 there were 3,322 
banks with under $25 million in assets and only 49 with $10 billion or more.  By 1998 the 
former number had dropped to 1,257 and the latter had grown to 70.  Banks with assets 
between $25 and $100 million have also experienced a drop in number, while banks with 
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over $100 million have seen increases in their numbers.1 This growth in large banks has 
been encouraged by regulators since they are seen as more stable and larger banks seem 
better able to serve customers in the most efficient manner.  It is not, in fact, necessarily 
anti-competitive.  Even as the numbers of individual banks have fallen, the largest of the 
banks have similar market shares and effectively keep each other in check.  Also, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index and the three-firm deposit concentration ratio both remained 
relatively stable between 1988 and 1994, showing only modest increases.2 Competition 
remains stable, but the industry has seen a dramatic shift in its physical makeup. 
Perhaps the more dramatic change and the one having the most effect on the 
industry of late is the geographic layout.  The geographic locations of banks in the 21st 
century is vastly different than it was 30 years ago.  In the 1960s and early 1970s the largest 
banks were logically in the big cities with the smaller banks in suburban and urban areas.  
This is not true any longer by any means.  The largest banks have infiltrated even some of 
the smallest towns through purchases and mergers as small banks have closed.  This changed 
geographic distribution is what has the potential to make the largest effect and it has affected 
different areas of the country differently.  Having a single bank service a single community 
meant that funds came in as deposits from within the one community and they were then 
redistributed as loans, usually into the same community.  Today, however, with interstate 
banking, deposits could come in from one area and be lent out thousands of miles away.  
While this issue has been somewhat addressed with the Community Reinvestment Act of 
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1977, the potential still exists for deposits that come in from poor areas to be lent out in 
wealthy areas on an opposite side of the country.  It also could reduce loans to small 
businesses.  One benefit that regional banking does hold is that it makes banks less 
dependent on a certain area and therefore less prone to problems.  With large banks 
continually competing and a decent amount of small, local banks still in existence, there 
really is not a great deal of evidence of geographic dispersion causing problems, though it 
does still hold the capability to disenfranchise some consumers with poor credit. 
Lastly, the financial services and banking industry in the 21st century United States is 
still the most heavily regulated industry after public utilities.1 Banks and thrifts have not 
been set loose to take consumers money and run.  Because these businesses are backed by 
federal deposit insurance, the government still makes an effort to reduce corruption and 
maintain transparency and confidence in the industry.  Customers’ privacy is protected as 
well as their rights to fairness.  On products not covered by deposit insurance there are 
numerous laws protecting against fraud and excessive risk.  Banks are audited and must still 
follow many strict procedures.  The US government is not willing to allow such an 
important part of the American economy into the completely free market. 
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CONCLUSION: 
 The consequences of this great change in the makeup of the banking industry from 
the Great Depression to the 21st century seem to be positive or negative depending only on 
which side of the coin you are looking at.  Some consumers find the industry changed for 
the better and these individuals are obviously pleased with the new features.  Other 
customers, however, particularly many who were used to banking many years ago, are less 
impressed.  As new features are added to the industry, it seems inevitable that some must be 
lost.  The question becomes, do these additions outweigh the losses?  Since most bank 
services and industry factors cannot be easily quantified, it is not quite as simple as debits 
verses credits. 
 From one specific angle the banking industry looks greatly improved over the past 
30-40 years.  The number of products available to consumers in 1966 pales in comparison to 
the plethora of products available today in 2006.  At any one bank there are probably three 
or four different checking accounts that meet different needs, not to mention the new types 
of accounts like Money Market or NOW accounts.  There are fixed-rate and adjustable-rate 
mortgages as well as reverse mortgages and home equity lines of credit.  There are very few 
financial needs that go unmet in today’s banking industry.  Most banks have also expanded 
to offer consumers any and all of these products at one location.  There is no need to look 
very far to find a bank that offers a particular type of product.  Lastly, really no one can deny 
the expansion of convenience within the industry.  There are ATMs on nearly every street 
corner that are beginning to offer more and more services.  There is internet banking, 
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telephone banking, online bill payment and scores of other ways to access money 24 hours a 
day, 365 days a year. 
On the other hand, not everyone sees these new features as benefits to the industry.  
Coupled with the increase in products is the increase in marketing of these products.  No 
one can walk into a bank without being bombarded with advertising for new or additional 
products.  With increased competition for both loans and deposits, banks resort to trying to 
develop the latest gimmick to lure customers.  Related to this is the addition of fees 
associated with an increasing number of products as banks scramble to make a profit in the 
competitive market.  The competition has also drastically lowered the number of available 
bank choices for consumers and many customers see the only banking option as one of the 
giant banks located in their town and all over the country.   
Lastly, despite the increases in convenience and number of services under one roof, 
there is a distinct sense of loss of the “traditional” banking environment.  Customers no 
longer really frequent just one single branch of a bank and therefore there is a lack of a 
relationship between the customer and the bank employees.  Also, many consumers 
comparison shop and have different types of accounts with different banks.  The level of 
personal relationships in banks is definitely diminished.  Along these lines, the technology 
associated with banks has grown to humor-worth levels.  Speaking on the telephone with an 
actual person instead of a computer at a bank or other financial institution is, again, 
something of a national joke.  Consumers are growing ever more frustrated with this. 
Aside from the opposing consumer benefits and losses, there have also been 
economic changes that can be better quantified and provide a better conclusion.  
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Throughout the post-Depression years up until at least the 1960s, there were persistent 
regional differences in interest rates.  There were many reasons for this, with differences in 
costs of living and the difficulty in moving money being two main ones.  Since money could 
not easily move from one location to another and there were laws regulating where banks 
could do business, consumers could not take advantage of these interest rate spreads.  This 
market inefficiency exhibited a market failure which is in essence a loss to both the banks 
and the consumers.  As shown in figure 1 of Landon-Lane and Rockoff, the spread between 
interest rates in the Northeast and West went from almost 4 points in 1880 to around 2 
points in the 1950s and less than .5 points in the 2000’s.  In fact, interest rates rose and sank 
throughout the late 1990s almost in sync throughout the entire US.  In essence, geographic 
interest rate spreads became smaller as the banking industry spread out geographically.  
Following the chronological pattern of the interest rates, it can be concluded that the 
breakdown of geographic restrictions helped in the decline of the regional interest rate 
spread.  That being said, geographic deregulation increased economic efficiency in the 
banking industry and thus has had a positive overall effect.  The industry itself has also 
managed to grow at a sustainable rate since 1979 
 It remains to be seen just exactly what the banking industry will be bringing 
consumers in the upcoming decades.  If the past is any indicator, it looks like the business 
will continue to gain economic efficiency with at least some sort of loss in customer service 
and personal contact.  All evidence points, however, to the fact that banking is incredibly 
competitive in the 21st century and while competitor numbers may be diminishing, 
competition itself has remained unchanged.  As the banking industry moves into its second 
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decade relatively free of geographic regulation and free of interest rate restrictions it will 
hopefully get a chance to compete in a true free market.  If this is true, then the banking 
industry will be continually responding to consumer demands and adapting to the needs and 
wants of its 21st century customers.  The public can expect to enjoy the efficiency and the 
benefits of this. 
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